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ABSTRACT
One of the most challenging parts of reliability analysis is building a reliability model
of the system. Reliability block diagram, Markov models, and fault tree analysis are
some of the most common techniques for constructing a reliability model. Fault tree
analysis provides a way to combine components, which together can cause system failure.
This research uses both static and dynamic fault trees to quantify the reliability of a
hybrid vehicle system and to analyze supply chain risk. The hybrid vehicle combines
a mechanical power source, such as the internal combustion engine (gasoline engine or
diesel engine), and an electric power source (electric motor) to take advantage of two
power sources and compensate from each source. The hybrid systems complexity and
non-mature technology carry potential risks for the vehicle. This research uses a static
fault tree to analyze the reliability of the 2004 Toyota Prius under different operational
modes. We apply Bayesian analysis that combines survey data to estimate the reliability
of the hybrid vehicles battery. Supply chain risk analysis is increasingly becoming an
important field and supply chain risk models help identify significant risks that can
occur and the consequences if those risks occur. We use dynamic fault trees, which are
relatively new in reliability analysis, to understand the timing of potential failures in
different types of supply chains. We estimate failure rates for each supply chain under
different production scenarios and simulate delivery time for the supply chain.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF STATIC AND DYNAMIC FAULT TREE
ANALYSIS
We live in a world full of unknown and uncertainty. Many unexpected and uncon-
trollable things happen every day. In the field of engineering, failure is very common for
all kinds of engineering systems. Different failures could lead to different consequences.
Failures are caused by many factors, such like design errors, poor manufacturing tech-
niques and lack of quality control, substandard components, lack of protection against
over stresses, poor maintenance, aging, wear out and human factors (Verma et al., 2010).
Most often, we already know in what stage the engineering system is. The first step of
reliability analysis is exploring potential reasons which may give rise to failure. Based
on the relationship of each component in the system, the reliability model of the system
can be built to estimate the reliability. From the calculation results, we need to find
which reason contributes to the failure. According to what we find and the current stage
of the engineering system, some proper methods can be used to improve the reliability
of the system.
The most challenging part of reliability analysis is building the reliability model of
the system. Reliability block diagram, Markov models and fault tree analysis are the
most common techniques for constructing reliability model. Reliability block diagram
is a visual technique which use blocks to express logical relationship of the system.
The reliability of system is calculated by analytical methods. The biggest disadvantage
of the reliability block diagram is not considering conditions of the system, such like
dependencies between components, repairable components, coverage factors, multiple
2states. Markov models are developed to overcome these problems. But for complex and
large system, Markov model could become too complicated (Fuqua, 2003). Fault tree
analysis neatly sidesteps issues raised by Markov model by using diverse solutions.
Fault tree is based on the probability of individual components and logical relation-
ship between different components. According to the fault tree analysis, we can easily
identify the cause of failure and estimate the reliability information of a system. Fault
tree analysis consists of static fault tree analysis and dynamic fault tree analysis. In
static fault tree, the OR gate and the AND gate are often used to describe the failure
situation. The failure expression of a static fault tree is represented by minimal cut set
based on Boolean algebra. In dynamic fault tree, the priority and gate, the sequence
enforcing gate, the spare gate and the functional dependency gate can be used to depict
multiple failure modes in a single dynamic fault tree. The main methods developed to
solve dynamic fault tree are Markov models, numerical method and simulation method.
A dynamic fault tree usually consists of static gates and dynamic gates. The unique
function of dynamic gates is depicting interactions in a complex system, which cannot
be realized by static gates. In order to understand fault tree better, we apply static fault
tree and dynamic fault tree in risk analysis of different areas.
The hybrid vehicle is becoming more popular since it was invented. The hybrid
vehicle combines a mechanical power source, such as the internal combustion engine
(gasoline engine or diesel engine), and an electric power source (electric motor) to take
advantage of two power sources and compensate from each source. The hybrid systems
complexity and non-mature technology carry potential risks for the vehicle. In Chapter
2, the reliability analysis of hybrid systems is conducted with application to the 2004
Toyota Prius. We calculates the reliability of the hybrid vehicles by building fault trees
for different operation modes and applying Bayesian analysis that combine survey data
to estimate the reliability of the battery. Although the focus of this study is the hybrid
vehicle, the innovative Bayesian analysis that combines a prior probability distribution
3with survey data of customers can be applied to other engineered components, especially
new technology where reliability data is unavailable.
Supply chains are becoming more vulnerable and sensitive because of globalization,
complexity, and occurrence of various risk events. Therefore, supply chain risk analysis
is a significant field of supply chain risk management, which can help us recognize the
reasons of risk occurring and figure out the main reasons to have mitigation strategies.
In Chapter 3, we analyze supply chain risk by using dynamic fault tree. The reliability
models for two typical supply chains are built by dynamic fault trees. Then the failure
rates and delivery time for supply chains are estimated by simulation results under
low volume production scenario and high volume production scenario. An innovative
dynamic gate is designed for dynamic fault tree modeling.
4CHAPTER 2. ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF HYBRID VEHICLE
SYSTEM: APPLICATION TO THE 2004 TOYOTA PRIUS
2.1 Introduction
Interest in environmental issues, global climate change, and energy conservation has
contributed to the development of alternatives to the traditional automobile internal
combustion engine. The hybrid vehicle plays a pivotal role during a transitional period
from the conventional vehicle to an electrical vehicle. From 2007 to 2015, 3,915,883
hybrid electric vehicles have been sold in the United States (AFDC, 2016). As hybrid
technology matures and more hybrid cars are in use, the reliability of these cars becomes
an important issue for owners who want to ensure they are purchasing vehicles that
will last. Hybrid vehicles have great fuel economy, and some reports suggest the hybrid
vehicle is more reliable than traditional automobiles (Haj-Assaad, 2014). However, a
hybrid vehicle costs more and are heavier, and the battery replacement schedules are
unknown. Cold weather may lead to more failures in the hybrid vehicle (Hunting,
2016). Although surveys of owners of hybrid vehicles suggest these vehicles are reliable,
people may not be entirely truthful in surveys or accurately recall the reliability of their
vehicles (Jensen, 2009). The variety of opinions demands a more careful analysis of the
reliability of hybrid vehicles.
The existing literature on hybrid vehicles mainly focuses on designing control method-
ologies to improve the efficiency of energy use and the vehicles performance under differ-
ent environmental conditions. Bizon (2011) proposes a topology method that improves
the performance of the inverter system to increase the efficiency of operation and relia-
5bility of the whole system. Meegahawatte (2010) prove that potential energy could be
saved from hydrogen-powered fuel cells by analyzing a fuel cell series hybrid and com-
paring different fuels powered vehicles. Pourhashemi (2014) introduce a method for
helping designers find an optimal design of a parallel hybrid electric vehicle. Panday
(2015) show the performance and lifetime of vehicle are highly influenced by the variable
temperature.
A large portion of the literature analyzes the effect of hybrid vehicles on the environ-
ment, the economy, and driving behavior. Kaushal et al. (2009) finds the factors which
can minimize life cycle cost, petroleum consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions to
obtain the optimal design of plug-in hybrids. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) present
the popularity of hybrids may increase on account of sales tax waivers and higher fuel
prices which could lead to the future fuel savings. Fontaras et al. (2008) find remark-
able advantage of hybrids on fuel economy and air emissions. Some of the literature
focuses on predicting or improving the reliability of different components in the hybrid
vehicle. Hirschmann et al. (2007) predict the reliability of inverters in hybrid electri-
cal vehicles by developing a simulation to estimate the temperature of a three-phase
converter during long operations. Mirhakimi and Karimi (2014) recommend more re-
dundancy within a hybrid vehicle. Allella et al. (2005) develop an optimization model
to increase the reliability of the hybrid vehicles electric propulsion system. However, no
study has attempted to model the reliability of the entire hybrid vehicle and analyze how
the reliability changes under different operating modes.
The hybrid vehicle system is a complex system because it combines an internal com-
bustion engine and electric battery. Often, more components in a system mean more
potential for failure (Rausand et al., 2004), but it remains to be seen if this is true with
the hybrid vehicle system. The hybrid vehicle has multiple operation modes, and each of
these modes could fail. The propulsion system is composed of a prime motor, an electric
motor with DC/DC converter, a DC/AC inverter, a controller, an energy storage system,
6and a transmission system. This paper estimates the probability of failure for the main
functional components and uses these failure probabilities to estimate the reliability per-
formance of the hybrid system in distinct operation modes. Due to limited knowledge
and data about the hybrid vehicles battery, we employ a Bayesian approach to estimate
the reliability of this component. The innovative Bayesian analysis combines a prior
probability distribution with survey data from owners of a hybrid vehicle to estimate
parameters for a Weibull probability distribution. This method can be applied to new
technology where reliability data might be limited or unavailable.
The Toyota Prius is one of the more popular hybrid vehicles on the market and
represents the newest hybrid technology. The second generation Prius won the prestigious
Motor Trend Car of the Year award and best-engineered vehicle of 2004 (Koraku, 2003).
This paper assesses the reliability of the 2004 Toyota Prius although the model can be
extended to other hybrid vehicle systems. The 2004 Toyota Prius uses the Toyota Hybrid
System II (THS-II) hybrid system, which is equipped with a high voltage (HV) battery,
engine, motor and generator, power control unit (PCU), and planetary gear unit. THS-II
has both series and parallel system configuration.
The unique contributions of this paper are the development of a fault-tree model to
quantify the time-dependent reliability of the hybrid vehicle and using Bayesian analysis
to estimate the probability the HV battery will fail. The Bayesian model relies on
customer survey data, which we treat as interval data. To our knowledge, this paper
represents the first overall model and analysis of the hybrid vehicle. Section 2 describes
the fault-tree model and the Bayesian analysis for reliability. Section 3 applies the
fault tree model and reliability analysis to the 2004 Toyota Prius and calculates time-
dependent probabilities for the hybrid vehicle. Conclusions appear in Section 4.
72.2 Model
This paper models and calculates the reliability of the 2004 Toyota Prius by devel-
oping a fault tree for different operation modes and use typical functions for reliability.
Most of the components reliability is described by an exponential function based on a
components mean time to failure (MTTF ). The hybrid vehicle batterys reliability is
described by a Weibull distribution, and the parameters of this distribution are esti-
mated using Bayesian analysis. The components reliabilities are used in the fault tree
for different operation modes to calculate the probability of failure for the hybrid system.
2.2.1 Fault Tree
A fault tree is used to model the probability a system fails based on the probability
failures of individual components. We can identify the cause of failure and obtain the
reliability of a system from fault tree analysis. The fault tree allows us to determine the
operational relationship among different components under different operation modes,
and we use the fault tree to derive analytical expressions for the probability of failure.
2.2.2 Reliability Based on Exponential Distribution
The fault tree requires assessing the probability that each component will fail. Since
the goal of this analysis is to determine the probability of failure at different points in
time, we seek a method to evaluate the reliability of each component. Many components
in an engineering system are standard components whose failure rates are known. We
assume the reliability R(t) at time t of a standard component follows an exponential
distribution (Rausand et al., 2004):
R(t) = P (T > t) = e−vt (t ≥ 0) (2.1)
8where T is the random variable for the time of failure and v > 0 is the rate of failure for
the exponential distribution. The MTTF is:
MTTF =
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−vtdt =
1
v
(2.2)
We use a components MTTF to calculate v and the exponential distribution to calculate
the probability a component has failed by time t. The probability a component has failed
within the time interval [0, t] is:
P (T ≤ t) = 1−R(t) = 1− e−vt (2.3)
2.2.3 Reliability Based on Bayesian Analysis
As will be discussed in Section 3, new engineering systems will have new components
whose reliability or MTTF is unknown. We may have some information about the fail-
ure rate. This information could come from initial tests or, as is the case in this paper,
from customer survey data. We consider that the distribution for the probability that
the component fails within the time interval [0, t] follows a Weibull distribution
P (T ≤ t) = F (t|β, λ) = 1− e−λtβ (2.4)
where λ > 0 is the scale parameter and β > 0 is the shape parameter for the Weibull
distribution. The Weibull distribution provides greater flexibility to model the proba-
bility of failure than the exponential distribution. The Weibull distribution can model
9hazard functions that are decreasing, increasing, or constant.
The probability density for the Weibull distribution is:
f(t|β, λ) = λβtβ−1e−λtβ (2.5)
Bayesian analysis requires prior probability distributions for λ and β, and we assume
each of these parameters follows a gamma distribution. Typically, the parameters for
the gamma distribution are chosen so that the gamma distribution is “non-informative”
and closely resembles a uniform distribution (Gelman et al., 2014). The goal of the
Bayesian analysis is to use the known information to estimate posterior distributions for
λ and β.
The known information in this paper is derived from consumer survey data in which
customers report time intervals in which the component has failed. If a consumer reports
that a component fails within a time interval[t1, t2], the likelihood of observing this result
is:
P (t1 ≤ T ≤ t2) = F (t2|β, λ)− F (t1|β, λ) (2.6)
where F (t2|β, λ) is the Weibull cumulative distribution function from equation (2.4).
Sometimes a consumer reports that he or she has used an engineered systems for a
length of time t3 and the component has not failed within that that time. This ob-
servation is typically called censored data because the observation has a lower bound
but no upper bound. For this type of observation, the likelihood of observing that the
component has not failed before t3 is:
P (t3 ≤ T ) = 1− F (t3|β, λ) (2.7)
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Bayes rule allows us to use these likelihood functions with the prior distributions for β
and λ to calculate a posterior distributions for these parameters:
g(β, λ|t) = L(t|β, λ)h(β)h(λ)
p(t)
(2.8)
where t is a vector of observations (intervals or censored values), g(β, λ|t) is the posterior
joint probability distribution for β and λ given the observations t, L(t|β, λ) represents
the likelihood of observing the interval or censored data as represented by equations (2.6)
and (2.7) , h(·) represents the gamma prior distribution, and p(t) is the normalization
constant.
Since the prior distributions are not conjugate with the likelihood distributions, an
analytical solution for g(β, λ|t) is impossible. The Gibbs sampler, a type of Markov
Chain Monte Carlo simulation, can be used to estimate g(β, λ|t).
The Gibbs sampler is used to estimate the posterior distributions for β and λ. The
Gibbs sampler requires distributions for each parameter conditional on the other param-
eters and the observations: p(β|λ, t) and p(λ|β, t). The algorithm for the Gibbs sampler
is as follows:
1. Choose a set of initial values for the parameters β0, λ0
2. Generate (β1, λ1|β0, λ0)by sampling:
β1 from p(β|λ0, t)
λ1 from p(λ|β1, t)
3. Repeat step 2 n times to obtain chain {β0, λ0; β1, λ1; βn, λn}.
The results of Gibbs sampler is convergent under some regularity conditions. The
simulation can generate the conditional distributions p(β|λ, t) and p(λ|β, t), which are
difficult to obtain from analytical calculation. WinBUGS (Lunn et al., 2000) is free
11
software that implements the Gibbs sampler in the Windows environment to simulate
and calculate the posterior distribution.
Bayesian analysis for reliability with censored or interval data has seen a limited
amount of research. Coolen (1997), Coolen (1996) developed an innovative model for
Bayesian analysis of failure data and introduced a method to perform reliability analysis
based on priors derived from an engineers experience and censored data. Van Dorp and
Mazzuchi (2004) build a Bayes inference model and use Markov chain Monte Carlo meth-
ods for life testing. Fernandez (2000) applied a Bayesian approach for reliability analysis
with censored data. Other papers use a Bayesian approach to incorporate censored data
of different problems in different areas. Wong et al. (2005) use a Bayesian approach
to analyze multilevel interval-censored data from a clinical dental study. Greco et al.
(2016) investigation better methods based on Bayesian approach to handle a left-censored
continuous biomarker in a family-based study.
2.3 Application to Hybrid System
We apply the fault tree and Bayesian analysis to the hybrid Toyota Prius. A hybrid
system combines a mechanical power source, such as an internal combustion engine
(gasoline engine or diesel engine) and an electric power source (electric motor). The
hybrid system is designed to provide a smooth response and sufficient power while taking
advantage of the two power sources by compensating from each source. The hybrid
control system selects the best combination control mode of these two power sources
depending on diverse driving conditions. When the car is running at low speeds (less
than 40 mph), the electric power source is sufficient to provide power to the wheels,
and the hybrid system only uses the HV battery. If extra power is needed for sudden
acceleration, the hybrid system uses the engine and battery simultaneously. Although
hybrid systems are equipped with an electric motor, the electric motors do not need
external charging as in electric vehicles. In the 2004 and later Priuses, the traditional
12
brake booster is replaced by a new regenerative brake system to improve power efficiency.
Depending on the motor type, the regenerative brake system can increase fuel efficiency
by at least 20% (Ahn et al., 2009).
The automobile main components are the engine, automotive chassis, automotive
body, and the electric system. We keep five main components which are critical to the
operation of hybrid vehicle and leave subtle parts out of the analysis like joints, ball
sockets, and hoses. The main components are:
1.HV Battery
2.Engine
3.Vehicle Electrical Equipment
[Motor Generator 1 (MG1), Motor Generator 2 (MG2)]
4.Vehicle Power Control Unit
[Power Control Unit (PCU)]
5.Mechanical System
[Reduction Gear, Planetary Gear, Wheels]
The THS-II hybrid system in the Toyota Prius integrates the series hybrid system
and parallel hybrid system together to achieve better performance by using the benefits
of both systems. The system has two significant electrical devices: Motor Generator 1
(MG1) and Motor Generator 2 (MG2). MG1 and MG2 serve as both highly efficient
alternating current generators and electric motors, and they provide extra power to
assist the engine if needed. A planetary gear unit is a power splitting device. MG1 is
connected to the sun gear, MG2 is connected to the ring gear, and the engine output shaft
is connected to the planetary gear. The sun gear and ring gear belong to the planetary
gear. These components are used to combine power delivery from the engine and MG2,
and to recover energy to the HV Battery. A reduction gear is used to ensure extremely
quiet operation. After simplification, the THS-II system can be drawn as Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Simplified Structure of Hybrid System
2.3.1 Fault Tree Model
Since the operation of a hybrid system depends on the driving conditions, the fault
tree considers the different operational scenarios. The five operational scenarios are:
starting, driving under normal conditions, sudden acceleration, deceleration and braking,
and battery recharging (Koraku, 2003).
A functional block diagram describes the operational logic among different compo-
nents and demonstrates how the components work together in series or in parallel. The
functional block diagram is translated to a fault tree where components in series in the
functional block diagram are connected via an OR gate in a fault tree and components in
parallel are connected via an AND gate. The 8 main components with their abbreviations
are listed in Table 2.1.
2.3.1.1 Start and driving at low speeds
When the hybrid vehicle is starting or moving at low speeds, the engine is not needed
to provide power. The battery outputs electrical current to the PCU, and the MG2 serves
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Table 2.1: The Abbreviations of Main Components
Component Abbreviation
HV Battery H
Engine E
MG1 M
MG2 N
PCU P
Reduction gear R
Planetary gear G
Wheels W
as a motor to generate power to the driving wheels. The MG1 rotates but it does not
generate electricity. The functional block diagram shows the main components in series
in Figure 2.2, which translates to a fault tree in which the components are connected
via an OR gate in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.2: Functional Block Diagram for Starting
The fault tree can be translated to a Boolean algebraic equation describing failure
during starting T1 as failure in one of the five components:
T1 = H + P +N +R +W (2.9)
2.3.1.2 Driving under normal conditions
During normal driving conditions (less than 40 mph), the engine runs and provides
power. The mechanical power from the engine is divided by the planetary gear unit.
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Figure 2.3: Fault Tree for Starting
Some of the power drives MG2, and some of the power drives the wheels directly. During
normal driving conditions, MG1 runs in the same direction to generate electrical power
for MG2. MG2 starts and runs to provide an electric assist as a motor. The functional
block diagram shows the main components in series and parallel in Figure 2.4, which
translates to a fault tree in which the components are connected via an OR gate and an
AND gate in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.4: Functional Block Diagram for Normal Driving Conditions
Boolean algebra reduces failure during normal driving conditions T2 to the failure of
one of the four components failing:
T2 = E +G+W +R (2.10)
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Figure 2.5: Fault Tree for Normal Driving Conditions
2.3.1.3 Sudden acceleration
Sudden acceleration or speeds over 100 mph require a sudden force which comes from
the HV battery. The battery generates current going to the PCU which passes current
to MG2. MG2 serves as a motor under this scenario. In order to ensure a smooth
response for improving acceleration performance, the engine and the high-output motor
should work together. During the sudden acceleration, the operation processes of engine
is the same as driving under normal conditions. The functional block diagram shows the
main components in series and parallel in Figure 2.6, which translates to a fault tree in
Figure 2.7.
Failure during deceleration and braking T3 includes the redundancy between the
engine and HV battery:
T3 = W +R +HE + PE +NE +GH +GP +GN (2.11)
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Figure 2.6: Functional Block Diagram for Sudden Acceleration
2.3.1.4 Deceleration and braking
During the deceleration and braking process, the Toyota Prius uses a creative concept
called regenerative braking. Regenerative braking converts kinetic energy to electrical
energy which is stored in the HV Battery. MG2 works as a high-output generator, driven
by the wheels. The functional block diagram shows the main components in series in
Figure 2.8, which translates to a fault tree in Figure 2.9.
The fault tree can be translated to a Boolean algebraic equation describing failure
during deceleration and braking T4 as failure in one of the five components:
T4 = W +R +N + P +H (2.12)
2.3.1.5 Battery recharging
The Toyota Prius cannot be recharged from an external power supply like a plug-in
hybrid vehicle. The HV battery has to maintain sufficient reserves to satisfy the driving
requirements. The battery is recharged by the engine which drives the generator (MG1)
when the battery level is lower than the standard level. Figure 2.10 depicts the functional
block diagram, and Figure 2.11 depicts the fault tree.
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Figure 2.7: Fault Tree for Sudden Acceleration
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Figure 2.8: Functional Diagram for Deceleration and Braking
Figure 2.9: Fault Tree for Deceleration and Braking
The fault tree can be translated to a Boolean algebraic equation describing failure
during battery recharging T5 as failure in one of the five components:
T5 = E +G+M + P +H (2.13)
Because the vehicle needs to operate in each of the five driving scenarios in order for
the vehicle to operate properly, the fault tree for the entire hybrid system connects the
five operational modes via an OR gate, as depicted in Figure 2.12.
The fault tree means that the failure in the hybrid system T6 occurs if failure in one
of the five modes occurs:
T6 = T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + T5 (2.14)
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Figure 2.10: Functional Block Diagram for Battery Recharging
Figure 2.11: Fault Tree for Battery Recharging
Inserting the failure modes for each of the five operational modes and eliminating similar
terms via Boolean algebra, we arrive at the minimal cut sets for the total failure in hybrid
system:
T6 = H + P +N +R +W + E +G+M (2.15)
The hybrid system fails if any one of the 8 main components identified at the beginning
of this section fails. This result should not be surprising because automobile vehicles
need all of their components to function in order to operate properly. Since the hybrid
vehicle can provide power via two different modes, one could wonder if the vehicle can
operate if only one of the power systems fail. Although the vehicle could accelerate
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Figure 2.12: Fault Tree for Total Failure in Hybrid System
suddenly via either the engine or the HV battery, the vehicle requires all components to
operate in order for all the operational modes to work correctly. The functional block
diagram, fault tree, and Boolean algebra justify this conclusion.
2.3.2 Data Collection and Component Probability Estimation
2.3.2.1 Engine and Other Main Components
The reliability of the engine and the HV battery are based on the number of miles the
vehicle travels. Since the reliability of other components are determined on the number
of years, we need to translate failure in number of miles to failure in number of years.
We calculate the average number of miles traveled per year in the United States. The
U.S. Federal Highway Administration records the average annual miler per driver by age
group (OHPI, 2016) (see Table 2.2). We weight the average number of miles driven by
each age group by the proportion of the population in the United States according to age
(Joyce A. Martin et al., 2015). Based on these two data sources, a car averages 12,826
miles per year.
The engine in the 2004 Toyota Hybrid is the Toyota 1NZ-FE/FXE engine. According
to WikiMotors, the official life span of this engine is 120,000 miles (WikiMotors, 2016).
Assuming 12,826 miles in a year, the MTTF of the engine is 120000/12826 = 9.4 years.
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Table 2.2: Average Annual Miles per Driver
Age Male Female Total Percentage
15-19 8,206 6,873 7,624 7.10%
20-34 17,976 12,004 15,098 20.30%
35-54 18,858 11,464 15,291 27.90%
55-64 15,859 7,780 11,972 11.80%
65+ 10,304 4,785 7,646 13.10%
Total=80.2%
Average 16,550 10,142 13,476 Weighted average=12,826
The MTTFs for PCU, reduction gear, planetary gear, MG1, and MG2 are calculated
based on the MTTF of engine and data from Ping et al. (2010). The authors present
the experimental data of mean time between failures (MTBF ) of main components in
the hybrid electric transit bus. We assume that proportional relation of MTBF between
main components in the hybrid electric transit bus is the same with the proportional
relation of MTTF of main components in the hybrid system we analyzed in this paper.
For example, we can calculate the MTTF of PCU by using equation (2.16):
MTBF of Engine
MTBF of PCU
(in hybrid electric transit bus)
=
MTTF of Engine
MTTF of PCU
(in hybrid system of 2004 Toyota Prius)
(2.16)
From above method and assumption, we calculate the MTTF for the mechanical system,
the electrical equipment, and the PCU in the 2004 Toyota Prius.
The mechanical system in this paper includes the wheels, planetary gear, and reduc-
tion gear; the electrical equipment includes MG1 and MG2. But Hu et al. only list the
MTBF of the mechanical system and electrical equipment. We divide the MTTF of the
mechanical system and electrical equipment to obtain the MTTF for each component.
Except for the HV battery, the main components in this paper follow the exponential
distribution. We assume a failure in one component in the mechanical system results in
failure of the entire mechanical system. According to the property of exponential distri-
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bution, the MTTF of wheel, the MTTF of planetary gear, and the MTTF of reduction
gear can be obtained from the equation (2.17).
1
MTTF of wheel
+
1
MTTF of planetary gear
+
1
MTTF of reduction gear
=
1
MTTF of mechanical system
(2.17)
We assume the MTTF of each of these three components are identical. In a similar way,
the MTTF of MG1 and the MTTF of MG2 can be derived.
2.3.2.2 HV Battery
The 2004 Toyota Priuss battery is a nickel metal hybrid battery. To our knowledge, no
official data on the lifespan of this HV battery exists. The Panasonic EV Energy Ni-MH
handbook (PanasonicCorporation, 2016) claims this kind of battery can be recharged
over 500 times, but translating this recharging information to the lifetime of the HV
battery requires additional data, which is not available.
Given this lack of reliable data on the lifetime of the HV battery, we estimate the
probability that the HV battery fails each year based on a survey of the number on the
number of miles the HV battery lasts. An online poll conducted in PRIUSchat asked
users how many miles their HV battery lasted (PriusChat, 2013). Although this survey
is not scientific and there is no way to verify if the users are truthful, the survey provides
some information that can be used to estimate the reliability of a HV battery. Table 2.3
shows the result of the survey of hybrid battery, and we use 12,826 miles per year to
estimate the failure in terms of number of years.
We use the Bayesian approach described in Subsection 2.3 to estimate the reliability of
the HV battery and assume a Weibull distribution for failure. The likelihood functions
come from equations (2.6) and (2.7). If the battery fails before 100,000 miles (or 7.8
years), the likelihood function is P (t ≤ 7.8) = F (7.8|β, λ). If the battery fails between
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Table 2.3: Survey of Battery Performance
How is your Gen 2 Prius (2004-2009) Hybrid Battery Doing?
Failed below 100,000 miles (7.8 years) 6 vote(s)
Failed between 100,000 and 150,000 miles (7.8 years-11.7 years) 8 vote(s)
Failed between 150,000 and 200,000 miles (11.7 years-15.6 years) 5 vote(s)
Failed at over 200,000 miles (15.6 years) 1 vote(s)
Has not failed below 100,000 miles (7.8 years) 42 vote(s)
Has not failed between 100,000 and 150,000 miles (7.8 years-11.7 years) 37 vote(s)
Has not failed between 150,000 and 200,000 miles (11.7 years-15.6 years) 19 vote(s)
Has not failed at over 200,000 miles (15.6 years) 8 vote(s)
100,000 and 150,000 miles (7.8 and 11.7 years), we use the likelihood function in equation
(2.6) where t2 = 11.7 and t1 = 7.8. The formula is similar for when the battery fails
between 150,000 and 200,000 miles (11.7 and 15.6 years). If the battery fails over 200,000
miles (15.6 years), we use the likelihood function in equation (2.7) where t3 = 15.6. If
the battery has not failed below 100,000 miles (7.8 years), we use equation (2.7) where
t3 = 7.8. If the battery has not failed between 100,000 and 150,000 miles (7.8 and 11.7
years), that means the battery has not failed before 11.7 years. Thus, we use equation
(2.7) where t3 = 11.7. Equation (2.7) is similarly used when the battery has not failed
between 150,000 and 200,000 miles (11.7 and 15.6 years).
The prior distributions for β and λ are gamma distributions where the parameters for
the gamma distributions are chosen so that the gamma distribution resembles a uniform
distribution. We use WinBUGS to run the Gibbs sampler and run 3 separate chains
each with a burn-in phase of 1500 samples. The burn-in phase means that first 1500
samples are discarded. After the burn-in phase, we record 1000 samples for each chain.
Figure 2.13 depicts the 3 chains for (a) β and (b) λ. With 3 chains, we have a total of
3000 samples. The different lines represent different chains or runs in the simulation.
The mean value for β is 2.808 with a standard deviation of 0.3487. The mean value for
λ is 4.284×10−4 with a standard deviation of 3.333×10−4. We use the 3000 samples for β
and λ with the Weibull distribution to simulate failure times for the battery. Figure 2.14
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(a) Samples of β
(b) Samples of λ
Figure 2.13: Gibbs sampler results for β and λ
depicts the histogram of this simulation.
The MTTF for this simulation is 16.2731 years. As Figure 2.14 shows, the HV
battery has a 0.2647 probability of lasting more than 20 years and a 0.0247 probability
of lasting more than 30 years. These results seem to overestimate the lifetime of a battery.
Although a battery could last 20 years, it seems very unlikely that a battery will last 30
years or more. Thus, we desire a method that will use the survey and limit the results
to lifetimes that appear more reasonable.
We set an upper limit during the Bayesian optimization by assuming that the battery
never lasts longer than a predefined number of years. Most vehicles fail before 300,000
miles, and we set 300,000 miles, or 23.39 years, as the upper bound for the four likelihood
equations without an upper limit. Running 3000 samples in the Bayesian optimization
reveals that the mean value of β is 3.845 with a standard deviation of 0.3571and the
mean value for λ is 5.333 × 10−5 with a standard deviation of 1.071 × 10−4. Using the
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simulated values of β and λ with the Weibull distribution reveals the follow histogram
for the lifetime of the battery in Figure 2.15. The MTTF of this distribution is 13.70
years with only a 0.0637 probability the battery lasts longer than 20 years.
Figure 2.14: Histogram of Failure Time
We repeat the Bayesian optimization simulation with an upper limit of 250,000 miles
(19.49 years) and 200,000 miles (15.59 years). Figure 2.16 depicts the time to failure
for the battery using a limit of 19.49 years. Running 3000 samples in the Bayesian
optimization reveals that the mean value of β is 4.575 with a standard deviation of 0.4607
and the mean value for λ is 1.028×10−5 with a standard deviation of 1.226×10−5. Using
the simulated values of β and λ with the Weibull distribution predicts the distribution
of the battery lifetime in Figure 2.16. The MTTF of this distribution is 13.11 years with
only a 0.0150 probability the battery lasts longer than 20 years.
Figure 2.17 depicts the time to failure with a limit of 15.59 years. Running 3000
samples in the Bayesian optimization reveals that the mean value of β is 5.671 with a
standard deviation of 0.7739 and the mean value for λ is 2.059 × 10−6 with a standard
deviation of4.442 × 10−6. Using the simulated values of β and λ with the Weibull dis-
tribution reveals the follow histogram for the lifetime of the battery in Figure 2.17. The
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Figure 2.15: Histogram of Failure Times With Upper Limit of 300,000 Miles
MTTF of this distribution is 12.06 years with a 0 probability the battery lasts longer
than 20 years.
Table 2.4 displays the results on the reliability of the HV battery for different upper
limits. We need to determine which probability distribution is the most reasonable.
The average age of vehicles in the United States is 11.5 years (Gardner, 2015), which
suggests that perhaps we should choose a smaller upper limit so that there is close to a
0.5 probably the battery fails before 11.5 years. However, the average age of the vehicle
does not really explain how long a battery will last because many factors influence why
a person disposes of a vehicle and purchases a new one.
Table 2.4: Probability that HV Battery Fail Before a Given Time Period
Upper Bound P(1 year) P(5) P(10) P(15) P(20)
No upper bound 0.0003 0.0207 0.1793 0.4473 0.7353
300,000 miles 0.0003 0.0167 0.1877 0.6150 0.9363
250,000 miles 0 0.0100 0.1780 0.7007 0.9850
201,000 miles 0 0.0060 0.2083 0.8860 1.0000
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Figure 2.16: Histogram of Failure Times With Upper Limit of 250,000 Miles
Selecting 250,000 miles, or 19.5 years, as the upper limit seems most reasonable to
us. The MTTF is 13.1143 years and there is only a 0.0150 probability the battery will
last longer than 20 years. (Even though the limit is 19.5 years, a battery can last longer
than 19.5 years. The upper limit assumes that a battery has not lasted longer than 19.5
years, but it is still possible a battery could last longer than 19.5 years.)
2.3.3 Results
Due to limited data of the lifetime of the HV battery, we assess the reliability of the
HV battery by using Bayesian approach. The Gibbs sampler allows us to estimate pos-
terior the posterior distribution, which are used to model the failure of the HV battery.
The probability of failure for the HV battery in a given year can be obtained from the
simulation results. The other main components are standard components. We assume
the reliability of a standard component at specific time follows the exponential distri-
bution. The parameter of the exponential distribution is calculated from the MTTF
of each component. The probability of failure of a standard component in a given year
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Figure 2.17: Histogram of Failure Times With Upper Limit of 200,000 Miles
is calculated from equation (2.3). Table 2.5 shows the MTTF and the probability of
failure for each of the main components. P (t) represents the probability a component
fails within t years.
The Boolean algebraic equations in Section 3.1 shows the logical relation for each
operation modes failure. We use the probability of failure for the main components in
Table 2.5 with the Boolean algebraic equation for each operation mode to calculate the
probability of failure for different operation modes at specific times. Table 2.6 depicts
the probability of operation failure at specific time. Figure 2.18 displays the probabilities
of failure for the entire hybrid system.
These calculations estimate that a hybrid vehicle has a 0.9985 probability of failing
within 5 years, and Figure 18 shows that the probability of failure increases dramatically
in the first few years. From Table 5, the probabilities the HV battery and engine fail are
smaller than the other main components. The PCU has highest probability of failure,
and the MTTF of the PCU is 2.682 years. The PCU consists of three inverters and
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Table 2.6: Probability of Operation Failure
Scenario of Failure P(1 year) P(5) P(10) P(15) P(20)
Start and low to mid-range speeds 0.5863 0.988 0.9999 1 1
Driving under normal conditions 0.4992 0.9685 0.999 1 1
Sudden acceleration 0.3373 0.9575 0.9989 1 1
Deceleration or Braking 0.5863 0.988 0.9999 1 1
Battery recharging 0.5479 0.9813 0.9997 1 1
Hybrid System totally fails 0.7284 0.9985 1 1 1
Figure 2.18: Probabilities of Failure of Entire Hybrid System
two converters (Emadi et al., 2008). Song and Wang (2013) show that these sensitive
power electronic component can influence the whole hybrid systems reliability. The
links between circuit elements are the most vulnerable link. The redundancy of most
converters is not considered in the PCU of the hybrids. If one of these converters fails
to work, it could lead to the total failure of PCU. Therefore, in our results the reliability
of the PCU may not be as good as other main components.
Table 2.6 shows the probabilities of failure under the different operational scenarios
and for the entire hybrid system. Starting or driving at low to mid-range speeds and
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Table 2.7: Probabilities of Operation Failure Due to the Engine or HV Battery
Scenario of Failure P(1 year) P(5) P(10) P(15) P(20)
Start and low to mid-range speeds 0 0 0.0103 0.178 0.7007
0.985
Driving under normal conditions 0 0.10092 0.412521 0.654869 0.797243
0.880884
Sudden acceleration 0 0 0.004249 0.116567 0.558628
0.867671
Deceleration or Braking 0 0 0.0103 0.178 0.7007
0.985
Battery recharging 0 0.10092 0.418572 0.716302 0.939315
0.998213
Hybrid System totally fails 0 0.10092 0.418572 0.716302 0.939315
0.998213
deceleration or braking have the highest probability of failure because these modes rely on
the PCU which has the single highest probability of failure. Sudden acceleration has the
smallest probability of failure, because of the redundancy built into this operation. As
can be seen from the functional block diagram (Figure 2.6) and fault tree (Figure 2.7),
there are two power sources-electric power and mechanical power-that can drive the
wheels. Even if one power source cannot provide power, the other one still can work.
2.3.4 Modified Reliability Model Based on HV Battery and Engine
The probability of failure of the hybrid vehicle is so high because the PCU has such
a large probability of failure and because the model assumes that components are not
fixed or replaced. Since the reliability of the hybrid vehicles electric and mechanical
components are based on data from Ping et al. (2010) which was for a hybrid electric
bus, it might not be accurate. The engine and the HV battery are the two most important
components in the hybrid system and the power source of the hybrid vehicle. Since the
accuracy of the failure of the other components is suspect, we next consider only the
failure of the engine or the HV battery. Table 2.7 and Figure 2.19 depict the probability
of failure under different operation modes if only the HV battery or engine fails.
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Figure 2.19: Probabilities of Failure of Entire Hybrid System Due to the HV Battery or
Engine
If we assume the mechanical system, electrical equipment, and PCU, the probability
the hybrid vehicle fails within 5 years is 0.42 compared with 0.999 in the original model.
The probability the hybrid vehicle fails within 15 years is 0.94. Alternatively, this mod-
ified model could reflect the ability to repair or replace components in the electrical
equipment, mechanical system, and PCU. It appears more reasonable that the hybrid
vehicle will have a reliability of more than 0.5 during its first 5 years of its useful life.
2.4 Conclusions
Based on existing literature, this paper first presents an overall reliability model for
the hybrid vehicle systems by constructing reliability block diagrams and fault trees
for different operation modes, such as normal operation, sudden acceleration, braking,
and battery recharging. We translate the fault tree to a Boolean algebraic equation
describing failure for the different scenarios. The standard components reliabilities follow
an exponential distribution, and we calculate their probabilities of failure based on the
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MTTF . Since the HV battery has limited data, we develop a unique Bayesian model to
incorporate survey data to calculate the batterys reliability.
Several other components in a vehicle in addition to the eight components examined
in this paper could also fail. Other components may fail and need to be replaced, such
as hoses, clamps, and brake pads. Proper maintenance can improve the reliability of a
hybrid vehicle. These components are not included in our model. The better estimate
of the reliability appears to come from the reliability model that only includes the HV
battery and the engine, which raises doubts about the failure probabilities for the other
components. Future work can undergo better data collection in order to obtain a better
measure of reliability for all the components.
Other factors not considered in this paper may also impact a vehicles reliability.
Temperature could influence the reliability of the HV battery. Tesla Motors has reported
many incidents of spontaneous combustion in their vehicles due to unstable performance
of battery (Lambert, 2016; Byrne, 2016). Extreme temperature environment can cause
failure in battery operation. Moisture environment can result in electrical short circuit,
which generate and release heat, burning the line in the PCU. Electrical components are
small in size and highly sensitive to the environment factors like temperature, exposure
thermal shock, and moisture exposure.
Despite these limitations and assumptions, the model presented herein provides a
systematic framework for analyzing and estimating the reliability of a hybrid vehicle.
The Bayesian analysis that integrates survey data to assess the probability of failure for
the HV battery represents a unique method to measure the reliability. It appears that
the HV battery is quite reliable and more reliable than the engine, whose lifespan is
estimated at 120,000 miles. The reliability of the battery and engine lead to a vehicle
whose reliability exceeds 0.5 for the first 5 years of its life and whose reliability is 0.28
in year 10. Future research can undertake more careful studies of the engine, the HV
battery, and the other components to understand if the inputs used for this study are
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accurate. A more complete model could also consider proper maintenance of parts and
determine how that affects the vehicles reliability.
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CHAPTER 3. SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ANALYSIS USING DYNAMIC
FAULT TREE
3.1 Introduction
Supply chains are becoming more vulnerable and sensitive because of globalization,
complexity, and occurrence of various risk events. There are several risk categories of a
supply chain, such like disruptions, delays, systems risk, forecast risk, intellectual prop-
erty risk, procurement risk, receivables risk, inventory risk and capacity risk (Chopra
and Sodhi, 2004). Besides, there are a plenty of events could make threats happen, such
as natural disaster, war, and terrorism, inflexibility of the supply source, information
infrastructure breakdown and so forth. On March 2011, the earthquake and tsunami
destroyed supply chains of over 27,000 businesses in Japan. Only a few of businesses
recovered one year later (RebuildingTohoku, 2017). On March 17, 2000, a fire at a plant
owned by Royal Philips Electronics was caused by lightning, which damaged millions of
microchips. Ericsson, a major customer of Royal Philips Electronics, lost 400 million
dollars due to the crisis. For another example, Boeing tries to reduce cost and expect to
shrink the 787s development time by outsourcing. Superficially, outsourcing can reducing
cost because of the low-cost labor. However, some components outsourced may not be
assembled together. So the outcome is disappointing, and the development time of 787s
is extended. Boeing does not win the market share from Airbus and spend more money
(Denning, 2017). All these events demonstrate the importance of management of supply
chain risk. The key to making strategies is having a comprehensive understanding and a
thorough analysis of supply chain risk. By identifying and modeling risks, we can access
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severity of risks. According to the results of assessment and various sources of risks,
proactive and mitigating strategies can be made to response to potential risks in the fu-
ture (Sodhi, 2014). Therefore, Supply chain risk analysis is a significant field of supply
chain risk management, which enables us to recognize the reasons of risk occurring and
find the main reasons. Finally, we can choose better strategies to reduce risk (Sheffi
et al., 2005).
In general, to overcome vulnerability and increase the resilience of supply chain, one
supply chain may have multiple suppliers. Under the future uncertainty, the cost objec-
tion function models for single, two, and multiple suppliers are developed (Parlar and
Perry, 1996). Actually, the cost of supply chain is affected by the risk which may be
reduced by using proper number of suppliers. The method used to choose the number
of suppliers are designed to mitigate the risk of IT outsourcing (Currie, 1998). Besides
having multiple suppliers in supply chain, inventory also can improve the resilience of
supply chain. If agile supply chains try to compete in volatile markets, creating redun-
dancy and responsiveness is very helpful (Christopher, 2000). In order to response to
volatile markets, inventory should be concluded in supply chain. The accuracy of in-
ventory information can impact the supply chain performance (Fleisch and Tellkamp,
2005), so the stochastic inventory systems and vendor managed inventory are proposed
(Corbett, 2001; Waller et al., 1999; Dong and Xu, 2002). In a word, inventories play the
role as assurance of a supply chain (Bogataj and Bogataj, 2007).
In addition, the information system also plays a significant role in a supply chain.
The main work of information system is real-time sharing and processing production
information within a supply chain. Information system realizes closer coordination be-
tween partners in supply chain (Wu et al., 2006). In the above Royal Philips Electronics
example, another major customer, Nokia just had a little loss during the crisis due to
the quick response capability. Initially, the information of order delayed were shown on
the computer screens at headquarter of the Nokia. Later, managers of Nokia knew order
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delayed and formulated solving methods to move chip orders at the first time. Once the
information system breakdown occurs, the emergent information may not be captured
and shown in time. Hence, more information sharing makes a great improvement of
performance of the supply chain. The supply chain can seek lower risk by adjusting in-
ventory level or coordinating different components (Yu et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2000). For
further flexibility of supply chain, information technology and internet can be applied
on information system design (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004; Pereira, 2009; Williamson
et al., 2004).
In this paper, we analyze the main-backup supply chain and the mutual-assistance
supply chain. The main-backup supply chain has a main supplier, a backup supplier, in-
formation system and inventory. When the main supplier operates normally, the backup
supplier does not work until the main supplier fails. If both two suppliers cannot work,
the inventory will be used. The information systems failure can lead to unavailability
of the backup supplier. The mutual-assistance supply chain has two suppliers and in-
formation system, and does not consider the inventory. Different from the main-backup
supply chain, two suppliers of this supply chain work simultaneously. If one supplier
has a failure, the other supplier will help it out by increasing the production quantity or
production rate. Once the information system fails to work, either one of two suppliers
is unable to give assistance.
The fault-tree analysis is a useful technique of system reliability modeling, and it can
show the logic relationship of the input events and output event. Fault-tree analysis is a
classical tool for understanding operation processes and identifying failures in systems.
For a low volume high value supply chain, a robust method is developed to reduce the
likelihood of delays in material flow by representing the system of suppliers within a
supply chain as a fault-tree and determining the proactive optimum mitigation strategy
(Sherwin et al., 2016). However, the fault tree is unable to depict interplay between
components in a supply chain. Modern supply chain becomes more and more compli-
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cated. Whether in low volume or high volume supply chain, the interaction between
each component cannot be ignored. Therefore, dynamic fault tree (DFT) is constructed
to overcome the limitation of the static fault tree.
This paper builds reliability models for two typical supply chains by using DFT. Then
based on the function of each dynamic gate and realistic scenarios, we estimate failure
rates for each supply chain under different production scenarios and simulate delivery
time for the main-backup supply chain. Several unique contributions are made for future
supply chain risk analysis. First, we use DFT to model supply chain. Most existing works
of DFT mainly focus on reliability modeling for complex engineering system. Second, an
innovative dynamic gate, mutual-assistance gate are created for DFT modeling. Third,
for supply chain risk analysis, we calculate both failure rate and delivery time. Finally,
two different production scenarios, low volume production and high volume production,
are simulated by using different simulation methods.
The rest of this study is organized as following ways: Section 2 reviews the literature
in supply chain risk analysis and DFT. Section 3 introduces five dynamic gates and
presents the dynamic fault trees we build of two supply chains. Section 4 develops
different simulation methods for simulating different scenarios of two supply chains. Then
we show the simulation results. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented in
Section 5.
3.2 Literature Review
The frequency of nature disasters and man-made accidents increases exponentially
during the past decades in industrialized countries (Coleman, 2006). Nature disasters,
terrorism and some unpredictable events all give rise to the risk of Supply chain (Stewart,
1995; Brown et al., 2006; Chopra et al., 2007). Under this background, supply chain risk
has been extensively studied in the existing literature. The supply chain risk is usually
analyzed from a qualitative view or a quantitative view. From a qualitative point of view,
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the probability of occurrence for a risk event is assessed by different levels, such like rare
event and likely event (Raj Sinha et al., 2004). The severity of risk also be evaluated
from a qualitative view, such like low risk and high risk (Norrman and Jansson, 2004).
Some strategies and approaches are developed to help decision making (Giannakis and
Louis, 2011; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Meanwhile supply chain risk mitigation methods
also are proposed (Giunipero and Aly Eltantawy, 2004; Christopher and Lee, 2004). For
quantitative risk analysis, available past data is used to estimate the probability of risky
events (Tuncel and Alpan, 2010; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). In addition to calculating
probability, systematic strategies of managing and mitigating threats have been provided
(Tomlin, 2006; Klibi et al., 2010). Other extensive works have been done in the area of
management of disruption risk by inventory, facility location and empirical data (Cui
et al., 2010; Schmitt and Singh, 2009; MacKenzie et al., 2014, 2012).
Not only reliability analysis of engineering system but also supply chain risk analysis
can use fault tree (Aqlan and Lam, 2015). In the supply chain risk identification stage,
most tools are qualitative. Fault tree analysis is not used a lot in this field. Some
opportunities may exist (Hunter, 2009). In the area of predicting supply chain risks,
“Data Mining”and “Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)”are popular methods. During
FMEA processes, when some critical effects are found, fault tree analysis helps to analyze
causes from the lowest level (Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2008). From existing literature, we
only find Sherwin et al. (2016) represent a system of suppliers within a low volume
high value supply chain as a fault tree to identify risks and make mitigation strategy. In
their paper, when they build fault tree, they have not considered the dependency and
interplay between basic events which triggers the risk of supply chain. However, in the
modern supply chain, production information sharing and other interactions take place
at any time. One static fault tree could not integrate diverse failure modes by itself.
By comparison, DFT can expresses interplay which changes over time. However, a wide
body of research using DFT focuses on reliability analysis of a complex engineering
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system or computer system, such as aircraft power supply system, fault-tolerant flight
control system, floating offshore wind turbine (Huang et al., 2012; Yiping and Minghua,
1999; Zhang et al., 2016). As a result, a potential research area of supply chain risk
analysis using DFT exists. In this paper, we choose to use DFT to model supply chain
risk.
There are two main methods used to solve dynamic fault trees, analytical method
and simulation method. For analytical method, the Markov models are commonly used
to solve DFT. Boudali et al. (2007) present how to use input/output interactive Markov
chains to solve dynamic fault trees. However, the Markov model is complicated and time
consuming when the number of basic events of DFT is growing. Because the number of
states and transition rates increase exponentially when the number of basic events in-
crease. Therefore, an efficient approximate Markov model is suggested (Yevkin, 2015).
But this efficient method cannot ensure good accuracy of calculation. Some other analyt-
ical methods are developed to solve DFT. Generating the minimal cut set or sequence use
a zero-suppressed binary decision diagrams (Tang and Dugan, 2004; Cui et al., 2013).
Besides using minimal cute sets or sequence, a new Bayesian network approach and a
tool which can translate DFT to Bayesian networks are created (Boudali and Duga,
2005; Montani et al., 2006). Compared with analytical method, simulation method can
conquer all limitations of analytical method. Monte Carlo simulated-based approach is
presented to solve DFT (Rao et al., 2009; Dai et al., 2011; Zhang and Chan, 2012).
Simulation method is utilized to solve the dynamic fault tree because of the following
reasons. First, it is difficult to include test and maintenance information in Markov mod-
els. Second, when we generate minimal cut set for dynamic fault tree, we have to make
independent assumption which is not accurate for complex system. Finally, simulation
method can deal with non-exponential distributions for time to failure and repair of basic
components. In order to simplify simulation processes, MatCarloRe, an integrated fault
tree and Monte Carlo Simulink tool has been developed. But this tool only handles with
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exponential distribution, Weibull distribution and constant distribution (Manno et al.,
2012).
In this article, we employ the idea of reliability analysis by using DFT on supply
chain risk analysis. Through building the DFT of supply chains, the logic relationship
between suppliers, inventory and information systems is represented by dynamic gates.
The probability of failing to produce product in supply chain and the actual delivery
time are estimated by different simulation methods.
3.3 Model
This paper constructs different dynamic fault trees for two typical supply chains,
the main-backup supply chain and the mutual-assistance supply chain by using four
traditional dynamic gates and a new innovative dynamic gate. After this, the failure rate
of each supply chain is calculated for two production scenarios, manufacturing one unit
of product and manufacuting several units of product. We also obtain overall delivery
time and the total units produced for each supply chain from simulation results.
3.3.1 Main-Backup Supply Chain
We consider a main-backup supply chain in which a single supplier provides product
to a firm. During the production process, for the main supplier, it is inevitable to have
a failure due to disruptions. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes or floods, or human
errors, such as improper operations, may cause a disruption (Li et al., 2013; Rose et al.,
2011; Staw, 1980). The model assumes an information system automatically relays the
status of the main supplier to its customer, the firm. After the firm receives information
that the supplier has production difficulties, the firm contacts a backup supplier who can
deliver product. The backup supplier may also experience failures, however. The firm
may also have inventory to help meet the supply difficulties. The information system
could also fail to inform the firm of the main suppliers difficulties. If the information
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system fails to delivery messages, the failure problems in supply chain will not be tackled.
This model can be applied to a low volume or high volume supply chain. In a low volume
supply chain, such as airplane manufacturing or the nuclear power industry, the supplier
only needs to produce a single unit of product. For a high volume supply chain, such as
a food supply chain or the automobile industry, several units of product are required.
The static fault tree consists of AND, OR gates. Dynamic fault tree introduces
dynamic gates in reliability modeling. Normally, a dynamic fault tree usually uses static
gates and dynamic gates in combination like what we have done in this paper. The
special use of dynamic gates is modeling interactions in a complex system for reliability
analysis. Dynamic gates are the priority AND (PAND) gate, the sequence enforcing
(SEQ) gate, the functional dependency (FDEP) gate and the spare (SPARE) gate. For
example, it is not enough that all events fail together to make PAND gate fail. PAND
gates failure is sequence-dependent. Figure 3.1 shows all dynamic gates (Rao et al.,
2009).
Figure 3.1: Dynamic Gates
In this model, we consider one main supplier, one backup supplier, information sys-
tem, and inventory in the supply chain. In Figure 3.2, a dynamic fault tree of this model
has one PAND gate, which has two basic events, the information systems failure and the
main suppliers failure. The trigger event of functional dependency gate (FDEP) is the
information systems failure, and the dependent event is the backup supplier. The princi-
pal component is the main supplier, and the spare component is the backup supplier in
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standby or spare gate (SPARE). The three basic events for the sequence enforcing gate
(SEQ) are the main suppliers failure, the backup suppliers failure and inventorys failure.
Event A represents the information systems’s failure. Event B represents the main sup-
plier’s failure. Event C represents the backup supplier’s failure. Event D represents the
inventory’s failure
Figure 3.2: Dynamic Fault Tree for Main-backup Supply Chain
The PAND gate captures a failure of the output event when all basic events have
failed in a pre-assigned order (from left to right in graphical notation). In the supply
chain model, if the information system fails (event A) before the main supplier fails
(event B), the information system will not alert the firm of the main suppliers difficulty,
which means the backup supplier will not be alerted to replace the production. However,
if the main supplier fails before the information system fails, the information system will
function correctly to alert the firm and the backup supplier. The PAND gate captures
this relationship because the PAND gate only induces failure if A fails before B, but
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the system functions if B fails before A. The FDEP gate depicts when the trigger event
happens the dependent events are supposed to occur. In this model, if the A happen,
the backup supplier will fail to be activated by A. The backup suppliers failure (event
C) is triggered by occurrence of A, which relationship is represented by FDEP gate. The
SPARE gate can fail only when the number of surviving components is less than the
minimum required (Manno et al., 2012). The SPARE gate models one or more principal
components that can be replaced by one or more redundant components. In this supply
chain, when information systems work normally, if the main supplier fails to produce
product, the backup supplier will be activated to work to replace the main supplier. If
both the main supplier and the backup supplier cannot produce production, the supply
chain will get a failure. At least one supplier can work, then there is no failure in supply
chain. The SPARE gate captures this relationship of the main supplier and the backup
supplier. Therefore, all of three dynamic gates, the SPARE gate, the FDEP gate and the
PAND gate, have failed simultaneously, which will give rise to supply failure, so there
is a AND gate connected this three dynamic gates. In reality, the inventory is always
used as a redundant supplier in a supply chain. We use SEQ gate to represent that all
basic events have to fail in a particular order. Other different failure sequence could
never happen. In this model, if the main supplier fails, and the information system still
works, then the backup supplier will begin to work to support the supply chain. Only
after the backup supplier fails, we could use inventory to provide products to the end of
supply chain. No matter whether the AND gate fails or the SEQ gate fails, there must
be failure in the supply chain. There is OR gate connecting the AND gate and the SEQ
gate in the dynamic failure tree.
3.3.2 Mutual-Assistance Supply Chain
Companies often have two suppliers to manufacture the same product simultaneously
(Sculli and Wu, 1981; Chung et al., 2010). If one supplier fails, the other supplier may be
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able to increase its production quantity or production rate. In a closely integrated supply
chain, an information system could provide information about the status of each supplier
to the firm and to each other. We name this relationship a mutual-assistance supply
chain. The unique relationship of two suppliers is mutual help and simultaneous work.
The mutual-assistance supply chain could also apply to two facilities owned by the same
company that produce the same product. Since a single company directs both facilities,
if one facility encounters disruption difficulties, the other facility could quickly be alerted
and increase its production. In this supply chain, we do not know the failure sequence
between two suppliers. Because the specific failure sequence is randomly generated from
simulation. It is hard for us decide a particular order of SEQ gate when two suppliers
and inventory are considered. We simplify the problem in the mutual-assistance supply
chain by not including inventory.
If both suppliers manufacture a single unit for a low volume supply chain, the two
suppliers work independently to produce same product, but each supplier might have a
different due date. If one supplier fails, the second supplier will not be able to change its
production plan if the information system fails to relay the failure of the first supplier
to the second supplier. The dynamic fault tree for the mutual assistance supply chain is
constructed according to different manufacturing scenarios and the structure of supply
chain.
Within a dynamic fault tree, the SPARE gate is used to model the relationship
between the main supplier and the backup supplier. In the prior model of the main-
backup supplier, if the main supplier fails, the backup supplier will start to work, but
the two suppliers in the mutual-assistance supply chain work simultaneously. Other
dynamic gates cannot model the relationship between the two suppliers either. We
design a new dynamic gate, named the mutual-assistance gate (MA), to represent the
relationship between suppliers. The MA gate is shown in Figure 3.3.
The MA gate can fail only when both basic events fail. When one of basic event
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Figure 3.3: Mutual-Assistance Gate (MA)
fails, the likelihood of failure of the other basic event will increase because the supplier
is increasing its production quantity or production rate.
In this model, we consider two suppliers and information system in the supply chain.
In Figure 3.4, the dynamic fault tree has one PAND gate with three basic events; the
failure of the information system (event A), the failure of one supplier (event B), and
the failure of the other supplier (event C). Similar to the main-backup supplier model, if
the information system fails before either supplier fails, then the operating supplier will
not receive the updated status of the failed supplier. This is modeled using the PAND
gate, but since both suppliers are working simultaneously, two suppliers are connected
via an OR gate. The FDEP gate is triggered by the information systems failure, and
the dependent events are two suppliers failures. These two suppliers are the backup
suppliers to each other in MA gate. All three dynamic gates, the MA gate, the FDEP
gate and the PAND gate, need to fail in order for the firm to fail to receive its product,
and an AND gate connects these three dynamic gates. In Figure 3.4, event A represents
the information system’s failure. Event B represents one supplier’s failure. Event C
represents the other one supplier’s failure.
3.4 Illustrative Example
As is typical with dynamic fault trees, we use simulation to measure the reliability
of the supply chain. The number of times an event happens is counted to measure the
reliability (Verma et al., 2010). We use different simulation methods for the two different
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic Fault Tree for Mutual-assistance Supply Chain
models (main-backup supply chain and the mutual-assistance supply chain) to calculate
the failure rate.
3.4.1 Simulation Methods for Main-Backup Supply Chain
A state time diagram helps to illustrate how failure occurs for the main-backup supply
chain producing one unit of product. The time between each failure for the supply chain
can be calculated from the state time diagram. The state time diagram is generated from
the dynamic fault tree and failure rate of each basic event in the fault tree. If the supply
chain produces several units of product, we use the simulation to calculate the number
of units of product that are provided and the frequency in which the product satisfied
requirements. We also calculate the time to delivery in order to capture situations in
which a supplier fails and recovers but may deliver product late.
3.4.1.1 Manufacturing One Unit of Product
In the main-backup supply chain, the state time diagram illustrates when failure
occurs in the supply chain. Available and unavailable status of each component in
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supply chain can be visually depicted by up and down states in state time diagram. In
our model, if the information system (A) fails before the main supplier (B) fails, it will
cause the failure of the PAND gate. Otherwise, it will not cause any failure. The state
time diagram of the PAND gate is depicted in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: State Time Diagram of PAND Gate
In the SPARE gate, for the active component, the main supplier, we generate time
to failure and time to repair according to probability distributions. The spare compo-
nent, the backup supplier, has different failure rates depending on the state of the main
supplier. When the main supplier does not fail, the failure rate of the backup supplier
is not affected by main supplier. If the main supplier fails, the backup supplier will be
activated, and it could fail due to attempting to increase its production rate. We assume
the probability of failure of the backup supplier (C) follows an exponential distribution
with a failure rate equal to αλ (0 < α < 1) given the main supplier (B) operates nor-
mally. The failure rate of the backup supplier equals λ given the failure of the main
supplier. The failure rate of the backup supplier increases if the main supplier fails. The
state time diagram of the SPARE gate is depicted in Figure 3.6.
In the FDEP gate, the trigger event is information systems failure (A), and the
dependent event is the backup suppliers failure (C). When the information system is in
the down state, the backup supplier must be in the down state. If the trigger event does
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Figure 3.6: State Time Diagram of SPARE Gate
not occur, the state of the dependent event cannot affect the trigger event. The state
time diagram of the FDEP gate is depicted in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: State Time Diagram of FDEP Gate
In the SEQ gate, the basic events must fail in a specific order. In our model, the main
supplier fails first (B), the backup fails second (C), and inventory fails third (D). The
simulation uses the failure rate λ to generate times to failure based on the exponential
distribution. First we generate time to failure (TTFB) and time to repair (TTRB) of
the main supplier. If the main supplier fails, the backup supplier begins production for
the firm. We generate time to failure (TTFC ) and time to repair (TTRC) of the backup
supplier. If the backup supplier fails, inventory could be used. We generate time to
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Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time 86400 hours (= 10 years)
Mean time to failure of each component 200 hours
Mean time to repair of each component 48 hours
α 0.5
failure (TTFD) and time to repair (TTRD ) of inventory. If the three basic events of the
SEQ gate are in down states, it will a failed state of the SEQ gate.
The dynamic fault tree of the main-backup supply chain connects the SPARE gate,
the FDEP gate, and the PAND gate via an AND gate. A failure only occurs if there is
a failure in PAND, the FDEP, and the SPARE gates. As depicted in Figure 3.2, the OR
gate connects failure from the information system and backup supplier relationship with
the SEQ gate that orders the main supplier, backup supplier, and inventory (Figure 3.8).
Since this is a notional example to demonstrate the applicability of the dynamic fault tree
to supply chain risk, we assume the probability of failure of each component in supply
chain follows identical exponential distributions. Table 3.1 shows simulation parameters
for each component in supply chain.
From the simulation, the supply chain exhibits complete failure 21 times over these
10 years. There are 10 times caused by AND gate. The AND gate connects PAND
gate, FDEP gate and SPARE gate. The AND gate fails, which means all there dynamic
gate have failures at the same time. There are 11 times caused by SEQ gate. The SEQ
gate has a failure, which means three basic events have common failure time. Figure 3.9
depicts a histogram of time to failure in this main-backup supply chain.
The mean time to failure of the main-backup supply chain is 3968 hours which is
166 days. The standard deviation is 3341 hours which is 140 days. The shortest time to
failure is 9 hours which is less than one day. The longest time to failure is 11540 hours
which is 481 days.
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Figure 3.8: State Time Diagram of SEQ Gate
3.4.1.2 Delivery Time of Manufacturing One Unit of Product
We are interested in using this simulation to calculate the delivery time for the prod-
uct. Since inventory is not delivered, we ignore the role of inventory in this section. We
only consider the failure of suppliers and the failure of information system, so we only use
a part of dynamic fault tree for analyzing, as depicted in Figure 3.10. Event A represents
the information system’s failure. Event B represents the main supplier’s failure. Event
C represents the backup supplier’s failure.
As discussed earlier, we measure the time to failure and time to repair for the two
suppliers and the information system. If the supplier fails after the standard delivery
time, the actual delivery time is equal to the standard delivery time. If a supplier fails
and then recovers, we assume the supplier can increase its production speed in order to
make up for lost time. fter a failure occurs, a supplier will increase the production speed.
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Figure 3.9: Histogram of Simulated Time to Failure
Table 3.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time 86400 hours (= 10 years)
Mean time to failure of each component 200 hours
Mean time to repair of each component 48 hours
α 0.5
Standard delivery time 200 hours
k 0.5
The parameter k, where 0 < k < 1, is used to represent that the delivery time will be
shortened after the supplier recover. If the time to failure of a supplier is less than the
standard delivery time, the actual delivery time is calculated by equation (3.1).
actual delivery time = time to failure + time to repair
+ k ∗ (standard delivery time− time to failure)
(3.1)
Table 3.2 shows simulation parameters for each component in supply chain. We set
the standard delivery time is 200 hours. During the total simulation time, we can get
a set of actual delivery time for each supplier. Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 are the
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Figure 3.10: Partial Dynamic Fault Tree for Main-backup Supply Chain
histograms of actual delivery time for suppliers.
The mean actual delivery time of the main supplier is 195 hours which is 8 days. The
standard deviation is 44 hours. The mean actual delivery time of the backup supplier is
192 hours which is 8 days. The standard deviation is 54 hours. The simulated overall
delivery time is shown in Figure 3.13. The mean actual overall delivery time is 189 hours
which is 8 days. The standard deviation is 40 hours.
3.4.1.3 Manufacturing Several Units of Product
For manufacturing several units of product, we use a different simulation method to
estimate the failure rate of the supply chain. The total simulation time is 43,200 hours
or 5 years. The duration of each trial is 720 hours, which is equivalent to one month.
The goal of this main-backup supply chain is to manufacture 1000 units, and the main
supplier can produce a maximum of 1000 units. The following steps show the logic of a
single trial:
We generate the time to failure of the information system (TTFA) and the time to
failure of the main supplier (TTFB).
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Figure 3.11: Simulated Actual Delivery Time of Main Supplier
Figure 3.12: Simulated Actual Delivery Time of Backup Supplier
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Figure 3.13: Simulated Actual Overall Delivery Time of Supply Chain
(1). If TTFB > one month, the main supplier will produce 1000 units.
(2). If TTFB < one month,
(i) If TTFA > TTFB , the backup supplier will work immediately when the main
supplier fails. If the main supplier recovers within a month, it produces 500 units. If
the main supplier does not recover within one month, the amount the main supplier can
produce is uniformly distributed between 300 and 500. We generate the time to failure
of the backup supplier (TTFC).
(a) If TTFB + TTFC < one month, the backup supplier will fail within one month,
and the number units produced by the backup supplier is uniformly distributed between
200 and 500 units. If the backup supplier fails, inventory can be used. We generate
the time to failure of the inventory (TTFD). If TTFB + TTFC + TTFD > one month,
the firm can rely on 300 units of inventory. If TTFB + TTFC + TTFD < one month,
the inventory may fail within one month, and the firm will have less than 300 units of
inventory. (b) If TTFB + TTFC > one month, the backup supplier will not fail, and it
can manufacture 500 units in a month. Inventory will not be used.
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Table 3.3: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time 43200 hours (= 5 years)
The number of trials 60
The duration of each trial 720 hours
Mean time to failure of each component 120 hours
Mean time to repair of each component 24 hours
(ii) If TTFA < TTFB, then the information system fails to alert the firm about the
main suppliers difficulty. There is a delay of 24 hours before the backup supplier works
to meet the order unfulfilled by the main supplier. The length of delay is 24 hours. If
the main supplier can recover in a month, it produces 500 units. Otherwise, the units
of product produced by the main supplier is uniformly distributed between 300 and 500.
We generate TTFC . From here, the logic is identical to that of (i)(a) and (i)(b).
We calculate the total units from the main supplier, the backup supplier, and inven-
tory in each trial. If the total units of product less than 1000 units, the supply chain
cannot achieve the goal. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 3.3. The his-
togram of the total units produced is depicted in Figure 3.14. The average number of
total units is 1137 units, and the standard deviation is 87 units. Among all trials we
simulate, five trials total units do not meet the requirement. Eight percent of trails fails
to satisfy the production goal. This simulation demonstrates how a firm can use this
dynamic fault tree to understand how likely it is that the combination of suppliers and
inventory will fail to meet the requirement of 1000 units.
3.4.2 Simulation Methods for Mutual-Assistance Supply Chain
In the mutual-assistance supply chain, we use different simulation methods for the
low-volume supply chain (one unit) and the high-volume supply chain (hundreds of
units). In the low-volume supply chain, we measure the frequency of failure and also
calculate whether or not the supply chain can meet the due date. A firm wants to know
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Figure 3.14: Histogram of Simulated Total Units
when it will receive a product. If a supplier misses the due date, the supplier has failed.
3.4.2.1 Manufacturing One Unit of Product
As depicted in Figure 3.4, the dynamic fault tree for the mutual-assistance supply
chain employs the new MA gate and does not include the SPARE and SEQ gate. The
basic events are the main suppliers failure, information systems failure and the backup
suppliers failure. The state time diagram of the MA gate has some unique properties.
In the mutual-assistance supply chain, the two suppliers are both actively producing for
the firm. At the beginning of the simulation, the two suppliers have the same failure
rate. If one supplier fails, the other suppliers failure rate will change due to assistance
relationship between two suppliers. We assume the probability of failure of each supplier
follows an exponential distribution, and the failure rate of one supplier is λ given the
other supplier is operating normally. The failure rate of a supplier is λ/β (0 < β < 1)
given the other supplier fails. The state time diagram of the MA gate is depicted in
Figure 3.15. Event B represent one supplier’s failure. Event C represents the other one
supplier’s failure.
59
Figure 3.15: State Time Diagram of MA Gate
Table 3.4: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time 86400 hours (= 10 years)
Mean time to failure of each component 200 hours
Mean time to repair of each component 48 hours
β 0.5
Standard delivery time 150 hours
Upper bound of delivery time 200 hours
k 0.5
Under the situation of manufacturing one unit of product, combining state time
diagrams of the PAND gate and FDEP gate and MA gate, we can draw the compound
state time diagram of each supplier. From the compound state time diagram of a supplier,
we obtain the time to failure and time to repair. On the basis of the standard delivery
time, the time to failure and the time to repair, we estimate the actual delivery time by
using equation (3.1). By comparing the actual delivery time and upper bound of delivery
time, we judge whether one unit of product can be delivered on time and identify failures
of suppliers. Finally, based on the number of failures and duration of simulation time,
the failure rate is calculated. Table 3.4 shows the simulation parameters.
The simulated actual delivery time of B supplier is shown in Figure 3.16.
The simulated actual delivery time of C supplier is shown in Figure 3.17
The mean of actual delivery time of B supplier is 153 hours which is 6 days. The
standard deviation is 40 hours. The total failure times of B supplier is 29. The mean of
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Figure 3.16: Histogram of Simulated Actual Delivery Time of B Supplier
Figure 3.17: Histogram of Simulated Actual Delivery Time of C Supplier
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Figure 3.18: Histogram of Simulated Actual Overall Delivery Time of Supply Chain
actual delivery time of C supplier is 155 hours which is 6 days. The standard deviation
is 43 hours. The total failure times of C supplier is 35. The actual overall delivery time
of the supply chain is depicted in Figure 3.18. The mean of actual overall delivery time
is 143 hours which is 6 days. The standard deviation is 27 hours.
3.4.2.2 Manufacturing Several Units of Product
Under the situation of manufacturing several units of product, we take the following
simulation method. As in the previous main-back supplier model, the total simulation
time is 43,200 hours, or 5 years, and the duration of each trial is 720 hours, or one month.
If there is no failure, a supplier produce one unit of product per hour. According to the
compound state time diagram of a supplier, we calculate the duration of down state.
Besides, we know the duration of periods when one supplier is assisting the other one
supplier. We assume that a supplier does not produce any product in down state. When
a supplier is increasing production to give assistance, this supplier produced 1.5 units of
product per hour. In every trial, the total units of product produced by a supplier is
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Figure 3.19: State Time Diagram of A Trial
Table 3.5: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time 43200 hours (= 5 years)
The number of trials 60
The duration of each trail 720 hours
Mean time to failure of each component 120 hours
Mean time to repair of each component 24 hours
β 0.5
calculated by equation (3.2).
total units = 1unit/hour× duration of each trial− 1unit/hour× down time
+ 0.5× 1unit/hour× assistance period
(3.2)
Figure 3.19 represents equation (3.2).
Table 3.5 shows the simulation parameters.The simulation results for two suppliers
are shown in Figure 3.20. The mean of total units produced by two suppliers is 1318.
The standard deviation is 105 units. If the goal is manufacturing 1200 units per month
for two suppliers, 8 trials will not meet the goal. Thirteen percent of trails fail to satisfy
the production goal.
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Figure 3.20: Histogram of Total Units Manufactured by Two Suppliers
3.5 Conclusions
This paper constructs dynamic fault trees for supply chain risk analysis. We analyze
the main-backup supply chain and the mutual-assistance supply chain. In order to
depict complex relationship between every component of supply chain, the PAND gate,
the FDEP gate, the SPARE gate and SEQ gate are used. A key aspect of this supply
chain is the information system that can quickly relay that the main supplier is having
production difficulties. We also create a new dynamic gate, the MA gate, for the mutual-
assistance supply chain. The models are illustrated using simulation for a low-volume
supply chain and high-volume supply chain. Some simple examples are presented to
illustrate simulating process of each simulation way.
Since this paper represents the first representation of supply chain risk using dy-
namic fault trees, we may make assumptions that do not accurately represent real supply
chains. We do not include all kinds of supply chains in our study, so some more complex
relationship between basic components of supply chain may be ignored. Despite these
limitations, our study provides the dynamic model for supply chain risk analysis. Based
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on simulation results, supply chain mangers can obtain helpful information for mak-
ing better production strategies or taking some proactive work to avoid supply chain
breakdown.
For future research, we can search some real cases and apply dynamic fault trees and
simulation methods on these cases. More suppliers and more complex supply chain can
be analyzed by using our methods. By reviewing more real supply chains, we can design
some innovative dynamic gates for different interactions in supply chains. Additionally,
we can build a Simulink library and form some blocks which represent different dynamic
gates, which could make simulation more concise and efficient.
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